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Of Witches and Robots: 
The Diverse Challenges of 
Responding to Unlawful Killings 
in the Twenty-first Century
Philip Alston
I. Introduction
From its relatively modest beginnings in 1945, the universal 
human rights regime has come a very long way. Few if any of those 
who drafted the apparently unthreatening, but nonetheless founda-
tional, provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with human 
rights would have imagined that less than seventy years later the Secu-
rity Council would have taken action in relation to serious human 
rights violations in a significant range of countries, that governments 
would have established an International Criminal Court, or that there 
would be a wide range of mechanisms that regularly and routinely 
hold states to account for their human rights performance across a 
very wide range of issues. This is not, however, to suggest that many 
of the most egregious human rights problems have been radically ame-
liorated. They clearly have not. The subjugation of women is a con-
tinuing phenomenon in a great many societies, and gender equality 
remains an unachieved goal even in the most developed economies. 
Racial discrimination is a constant and forms of ethnic and religious 
discrimination continue to be both inventive and invidious. Hunger, 
the denial of basic health care, and access to decent housing are prob-
lems that persist on a vast scale around the world. In addition, torture, 
disappearances, and unlawful killings continue to take place in the 
majority of states.
The purpose of this article is not to celebrate the institutional and 
other achievements of the international human rights regime, nor is it 
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to decry the terrible ills that persist side by side with these apparent 
achievements. Instead, the goal is to provide a better understanding of 
the ways in which the regime has developed and to illustrate some of 
the principal challenges that are emerging at the end of the first decade 
of the twenty-first century.
The lens that I use in this article to examine these issues is the chal-
lenge, long ago accepted as an urgent and pressing one by the inter-
national community, of seeking to respond effectively to and finally 
eliminating extrajudicial executions, or killings which by definition are 
unlawful under the relevant bodies of international law. This term cov-
ers many phenomena. They range from killings by government agents 
like the police or military in violation of either human rights or interna-
tional humanitarian law; through official tolerance or encouragement 
of death squads, paramilitaries, or other private killers; to the failure to 
investigate, prosecute, or punish crimes such as the killing of women 
alleged to have brought dishonor to their families through breaking 
certain social conventions—so-called “honor killings.”1
It is precisely because of the breadth of the practices involved that 
I have chosen to focus on two separate phenomena that might be 
thought to lie at different ends of the spectrum of types of extrajudicial 
executions. They are the killing of those deemed to be “witches,” a 
problem that arises almost entirely in traditional societies, and the kill-
ing of targeted individuals by means of unmanned robotic weapons, a 
phenomenon which is rapidly becoming ever more feasible as a result 
of technological developments. Each of these practices raises a host of 
fascinating questions in its own right, but by comparing and contrast-
ing some of the problems they highlight, it is possible to get a general 
sense of the type of challenges the international human rights regime 
confronts as it seeks to implement one of the most fundamental of all 
of the internationally recognized human rights: the right to life.
The essay begins in Part II by looking at both the nature and the 
extent of the problem of extrajudicial execution of individuals, usually 
women and sometimes children, who are accused of being witches, 
most commonly by neighbors or even family members. Part III traces 
the emergence of robotic technologies and examines their potential to 
use lethal force against human targets without direct human involve-
ment in the decision-making processes. Consideration is then given to 
a number of specific concerns to which these developments give rise 
and to the possibility of encouraging policy-makers to take steps to 
minimize the potential use of such weapons for carrying out extrajudi-
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cial executions. Finally, Part IV seeks to draw some conclusions for the 
international human rights regime as a whole from the juxtaposition of 
these two very different case studies.
II. Witches
Reports from a surprisingly large number of countries in different 
regions of the world indicate that the intentional killing of individuals 
labeled as witches remains a significant and very troubling phenome-
non. Such killings are by no means a thing of the past, as those familiar 
with the better-known historical examples from European or Ameri-
can history might suggest. Before giving an indication of some of the 
countries in which such problems are not infrequent, it is appropriate 
to recount the circumstances under which I was first forced to confront 
the horror and the complexity of this problem.
The town of Paoua, in the northwest of the Central African Repub-
lic (CAR), is locally known as the birthplace of a former president of 
the republic, but in recent years it has become something of a ghost 
town. Because it is far from Bangui, the national capital, it is generally 
neglected by the central government. In fact, the area outside the city 
center is largely at the mercy of bandits. It is also located very close 
to the border with Chad, making it subject to cross-border incursions 
by military elements fighting one or the other of the governments, 
thus ensuring a significant military presence. I visited on behalf of the 
United Nations in February 2008 to investigate unlawful killings. I 
was looking into killings attributed to the bandits and the President’s 
Republican Guard. There was no shortage of allegations and gruesome 
stories of arbitrary killings.
Early one morning, the head of one of the local communities came 
to see me and opened up a whole new dimension of the problem. She 
pleaded with me to do something about a major problem, which up 
until then had been largely invisible. It involved the killing of a number 
of women who had been alleged by their neighbors to be witches. Even 
more distressing was the fact that the killings had been carried out by 
the army in response to requests by the villagers. Her allegations were 
corroborated by other sources and the local police chief subsequently 
acknowledged other cases involving the killing of witches. As UNICEF 
subsequently reported: “Hundreds, or even thousands, of children and 
elderly people—women in particular—have been accused of being 
witches in CAR. Belief in witchcraft is widespread in the region….”2
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As I sat down to write a report on these incidents, and to identify 
the appropriate legal and policy responses to them, I was confronted 
with a range of questions that were not so easy to answer. At one level, 
there was little complexity. The simple fact was that individuals had 
been killed, not on the grounds that they had violated a particular 
state law, and certainly not after having undergone any sort of legal 
process that might have given them the chance to defend themselves 
against the allegations directed at them. There could be no justifica-
tion for such arbitrary killing, unsanctioned by law. There were, of 
course, factual issues that needed to be clarified, such as whether, as 
alleged, the military had received financial rewards for undertaking 
these killings, but that would only make the situation worse rather 
than changing the basic problem. Another complication was that the 
government forces apparently had no monopoly on such killings since 
the main rebel group active in the country, the Armée pour la Restau-
ration de la République et la Démocratie, was also accused of carrying 
out such acts. Ironically, it had been suggested to me that when they 
killed individuals, such as the head of the town of Badama who was 
accused of being a sorcerer and killed in August 2007, it was done as 
part of a larger effort on their part to fill in the law-and-order vacuum 
left by the relative absence of the central government authorities from 
the northwest of the country.
The more difficult question concerned the type of recommendations 
that should be made to the government of the CAR. For a start, the 
Criminal Code actually provided that a person convicted of “witch-
craft” (charlatinsme and sorcellerie) could face capital punishment, a 
prison sentence, or a fine.3 I was not able to identify any recent cases 
in which the death penalty had been applied, but it was reported to be 
common for individuals accused of such offences to be arrested, tried, 
convicted, and imprisoned on the basis of spurious evidence.
From this brief description of the issues, two straightforward recom-
mendations emerged. The first was to strengthen fair trial procedures 
so as to ensure that no one is convicted on the basis of flimsy evidence, 
but that still left open the question of whether there should be any such 
offence as witchcraft in the first place. The second was to eliminate the 
death penalty for this offence. Unless the offence involved an act of 
intentional murder, the imposition of the death penalty would be ille-
gal under international law, which requires the list of capital offences 
to be restricted to those involving the “most serious crimes.”
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It was also not difficult to recommend that the killing of witches 
should be prosecuted like any other murder, and that other violent acts 
against such individuals should also be prosecuted. Yet this still leaves 
open the question of whether or not to criminalize acts of witchcraft 
themselves. The concern was expressed that a legal system that fails to 
proscribe harmful acts carried out by individuals against others, even 
if done under the guise or rubric of magic, would lose credibility and 
leave many individuals feeling very vulnerable to being victimized by 
witches, who would in turn enjoy immunity from prosecution. Several 
other arguments can be invoked in favor of criminalization. One is that 
local customs and traditions should be reflected in national law, rather 
than being repudiated. This approach might be seen as vindicating the 
right to take part in the cultural life of the community, a right that has 
long been recognized in international law.4 Another is that the role of 
criminal law is to protect citizens against acts of violence, which should 
include those carried out by occult means. Another is that the failure of 
criminal law to address such acts leads inevitably to vigilantism, as 
individuals are forced to take the law into their own hands in order to 
achieve what is popularly considered to be a just and fair result.
Yet the arguments on the other side of the balance sheet are even 
more powerful. The criminalization of witchcraft by the state reinforces 
the social stigmatization of those accused of it. Indeed, the proscription 
of witchcraft tends to lead vigilantes, soldiers, and rebels alike to view 
the killing of suspected witches as legitimate. It is, moreover, a crime 
that lends itself all too readily to the persecution and victimization of 
women and children in particular. The biggest problem of all is the 
ultimately very subjective nature of the crime and the impossibility of 
identifying objective criteria against which alleged acts of witchcraft 
can be measured by a court of law. The “facts” upon which allega-
tions of witchcraft are likely to be based will generally be subjective, 
imprecise, and highly manipulable. As one observer has expressed 
it, “[m]ethods that traditional healers use to detect the secret practice 
of sorcery necessarily involve supernatural practices whose logic is 
opaque to observers.”5 Taking account of these considerations, I rec-
ommended that a clear and immediate message should be sent by 
the government by amending the Penal Code to abolish the crime of 
witchcraft.
In subsequent visits to Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), the problem turned out to be both widespread and 
chronic in those countries as well. In May 2008, it was reported that 
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eight women and three men in the Kenyan district of Kisii, aged 
between 80 and 96, had been accused of witchcraft and dragged out 
of their houses and burned alive.6 A similar incident, reported to have 
occurred in March 2009 and involving the killing of five persons, was 
reported through a video on YouTube.7 It is also clear from a range of 
sources that these incidents are just one example of a phenomenon 
that is relatively common in certain parts of Kenya. In the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the main manifestation of the problem affects 
children rather than adults.8 It has been reported that tens of thou-
sands of children who have been abandoned or driven out of their 
homes and are forced to live on the streets of Kinshasa and other major 
cities are especially vulnerable to witchcraft accusations. UNICEF has 
estimated that there are 50,000 street children in the DRC. In addition, 
“as many as 70 percent of the street children they worked with claimed 
to have been accused of witchcraft.”9
Unsurprisingly, this phenomenon is most prevalent in poverty-
stricken communities that lack access to education and social services, 
and the victims are often individuals with physical or mental disabili-
ties who are perceived to have “brought defects” into a family or com-
munity. UNICEF reported that at least twelve accused child witches 
were killed in three provinces (Orientale, Maniema and Katanga) from 
September 2008 to early October 2009, mostly by their own family 
members. Other sources have reported violence against women in par-
ticular, in contexts in which vulnerable members of the community are 
blamed for misfortunes, such as the loss of a job or illness.10
In 2010, UNICEF reported a major increase in accusations of witch-
craft against children in a range of African countries including Angola, 
Benin, Cameroon, and Nigeria, in addition to Kenya and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. Those accused were expelled from their 
homes, often attacked and beaten, and sometimes killed. The report 
identified three different categories of children who were particularly 
susceptible to such abuse: (1) those who were orphaned, suffered from 
a physical or psychological disability, had an illness such as epilepsy, or 
whose behavior was considered abnormal; (2) children who were sub-
ject to abnormal births, including a premature or otherwise unusual 
birth such as conjoined twins, etc.; and (3) albino children whose body 
organs are believed to have magic powers.11 While traditional healers 
are often involved in the victimization of such children, recent reports 
also emphasize the growing role of churches and cults that encourage 
exorcism of “evil spirits.”12 While there are no reliable statistics for 
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what remains a dramatically under-reported phenomenon, my own 
estimate, based on visits to several of the key concerned countries in 
Africa and reports published in relation to a range of other countries, 
is that thousands of so-called witches, overwhelmingly women and 
children, are killed each year in Africa alone.
Furthermore, the problem is by no means confined to Africa.13 Many 
other examples might be given, but it will suffice for present purposes 
to mention a case from Saudi Arabia, which seems emblematic of the 
problems involved in the criminalization of witchcraft. Fawzah Falih 
Muhammad Ali was sentenced to death in 2006 for the offences of 
witchcraft, recourse to supernatural beings, and slaughtering animals. 
In an analysis of the case, Human Rights Watch noted that the crime 
of witchcraft is not defined in Saudi law and that in order to find the 
defendant guilty the court had relied upon reports of events which, by 
definition, could not be causally linked to the defendant. The events 
included one instance in which a man was said to have become impo-
tent after being bewitched, and another in which “a divorced woman 
reportedly returned to her ex-husband during the month predicted by 
the witch.” The proceedings are also alleged to have violated a range 
of due process requirements, thus resulting in an unfair trial.14
This case study of witchcraft and the killing of those alleged to be 
its practitioners serves to illustrate a number of challenges to interna-
tional law. First, unlike violations of human rights that involve cross-
border activities or give rise to consequences that have an international 
dimension, the murder of witches can be characterized as primarily a 
domestic problem without necessary international ramifications. This 
raises the question of the conditions under which the international 
community should intervene in relation to practices or problems that 
are essentially within the domestic affairs of a state. But international 
law, especially operating on the basis of treaties which have now been 
very widely ratified, provides a solid foundation upon which the inter-
national community as a whole, and even other states, can express 
concern over any alleged violations that have occurred.
The second challenge concerns violations that are attributed not to 
governments, which clearly are bound by international standards, but 
to non-state actors that, by definition, cannot sign on to human rights 
treaties and should, in principle, be accountable only to the national 
government. In many, although certainly not all, of the instances in 
which witches have been killed, there is no direct government involve-
ment. Rather, it is private actors, often in isolated communities, who 
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carry out the killings. Many other types of extrajudicial executions are 
carried out directly by the police or military or other governmental 
agents, and in such cases the responsibility of the state is not in ques-
tion and the means by which accountability can be sought is through 
the application of the normal rules of international law relating to 
state responsibility. But the process is different where private actors 
are involved and there is no obvious state dimension. In those situa-
tions, international law has achieved a major breakthrough by holding 
the relevant governments liable in situations in which they have not 
shown “due diligence” in carrying out their own obligations to inves-
tigate, prosecute, and punish those who commit such crimes. Thus, in 
many witchcraft situations, the claim can reasonably be made that the 
state has become responsible for the fate of the witches because of its 
failure to punish the perpetrators and the fact that the victimization 
and killings continue largely unabated.
Third, there is generally an important cultural dimension to inci-
dents involving the killing of witches, which is not the case in relation 
to the type of killings addressed in the second half of this article. In 
other words, witchcraft-related killings may seek to be justified on the 
basis of local traditions which attach legitimacy and importance to the 
role of traditional faith healers and which also sanction the punish-
ment of those who are deemed to have used their spiritual powers 
to achieve evil ends. In such circumstances, it might be argued that 
outsiders should not interfere in complex matters involving culture 
and tradition, and that the local community should have a free hand to 
determine the most appropriate response. This raises the controversial 
question of cultural relativism, the implications of which go far beyond 
the limited confines of the present article. Suffice it to say that even in 
relation to what appear to be clear-cut violations of national and inter-
national standards, there may well be issues of sensitivity to cultural 
contexts and traditions which will have a significant impact on the way 
in which the international community can best tackle the problem.
The example of witchcraft killings thus helps to illustrate a number 
of the challenges that confront the international human rights regime 
more broadly. It also serves as a contrast in various respects to the type 
of challenges that emerge from the very different (but nonetheless 
related) problem of how to respond to targeted killings undertaken 





The forerunners to the robotic killers of the future are today’s unmanned 
aerial vehicles, or drones, as they are commonly known. Since at least 
2002, but with dramatically increased frequency over the past year 
or more, these vehicles have been used to carry out targeted killings. 
In doing so, civilians have also been killed, although the estimates of 
their numbers range from a figure of forty or so, suggested in unat-
tributed briefings by Central Intelligence Agency officials, to many 
hundreds, according to civil society groups. While most of the con-
troversy attaches to killings by the United States in the border regions 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan, more than forty countries already have 
drone technology. Some of these, including China, France, India, Israel, 
Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, either have or are seeking 
drones capable of shooting laser-guided missiles weighing as much 
as 500 pounds in total.15 On “Defense Industry Day,” August 22, 2010, 
the Iranian president unveiled a new drone with a range of 1,000 kilo-
meters (620 miles) and capable of carrying four cruise missiles.16 He 
referred to the drone as a “messenger of honour and human generosity 
and a saviour of mankind,” but warned ominously that it can also be 
“a messenger of death for enemies of mankind.”17
As I grappled with the problem of the legality under international 
law of developments that seem almost certain to involve a dramatically 
increasing use of drones to carry out targeted killings of individuals, I 
was also forced to confront an even more complex set of issues. In the 
foreseeable future, the technology will exist to create robots capable 
of targeting and killing without the need for direct human control or 
authorization. The question is how should international law deal with 
such developments? Are they matters that should be left to the discre-
tion of the states concerned or do existing laws and ethical standards 
already provide an adequate framework? Should the law adopt a dif-
ferent approach to killings such as these, carried out in accordance 
with procedures established under national law and with clinical pre-
cision, as opposed to killings of an arbitrary nature in settings where 
no law seems to count in any meaningful sense?
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B. The Relevance of Human Rights
Over the last decade, the number and type of unmanned or robotic sys-
tems developed for and deployed in armed conflict and law enforce-
ment contexts has grown at an astonishing pace. The speed, reach, 
capabilities, and automation of robotic systems are all rapidly increas-
ing. Unmanned technologies already in use or in later stages of devel-
opment—including unmanned airplanes, helicopters, and aquatic and 
ground vehicles—can be controlled remotely to carry out a wide array 
of tasks: surveillance, reconnaissance, checkpoint security, neutraliza-
tion of an improvised explosive device, biological or chemical weapon 
sensing, removal of debris, search and rescue, street patrols, and more. 
They can also be equipped with weapons to be used against targets or 
in self-defense. Some of these technologies are semi-automated, and 
can, for example, land, take-off, fly, or patrol without human control. 
Robotic sentries, including towers equipped with surveillance capacity 
and machine guns, are in use at the borders of some countries. In the 
foreseeable future, the technology will exist to create robots capable of 
targeting and killing with minimal human involvement or without the 
need for direct human control or authorization.
Some of this technology is either unambiguously beneficial or can be 
used to clearly positive effect, including, most importantly, saving the 
lives of civilians and limiting military personnel casualties. However, 
the rapid growth of these technologies, especially those with lethal 
capacities and those with decreased levels of human control, raise seri-
ous concerns that have been almost entirely unexamined by human 
rights or humanitarian actors, although some military lawyers, phi-
losophers, ethicists, and roboticists have begun to do so.18 The general 
lack of international attention to this issue is understandable. Other 
humanitarian or human rights issues—disastrous floods in Pakistan, 
killing and sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
or gang killings in Mexico—seem far more immediately pressing, and 
resources, time, and staffing capacities in the U.N., NGOs, and think 
tanks are always stretched. In addition, anything that smacks of sci-
ence fiction seems more at home in an Asimov novel or Terminator 
film rather than in a human rights report.
Various factors explain why the human rights community contin-
ues to see advances in robotics as an exotic topic that does not need to 
be addressed until the relevant technologies are actually in use. First, 
much of the information about these developments remains confined 
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to military research establishments and specialist scientific literature. 
Second, understanding the technologies requires expertise beyond that 
of most human rights experts. Third, the attractions of greater use 
of robotic technologies greatly overshadow, in the public mind, the 
potential disadvantages. And finally, there is a North-South dimension 
in that the Global North has the money and the technical know-how to 
develop the technologies, while many of the negative consequences of 
their use will fall much more heavily on poorer countries in the Global 
South.
The analysis that follows is predicated on two principal assump-
tions: (1) the new robotic technologies have very important ramifica-
tions in terms of the right to life and the fight against extrajudicial 
executions, and they raise issues that need to be addressed now rather 
than later; and (2) although a large part of the research and technologi-
cal innovation currently being undertaken is driven by military and 
related concerns, there is no inherent reason why human rights and 
humanitarian law considerations cannot be proactively factored in to 
the design and operationalization of the new technologies. But this will 
not happen unless and until the human rights community presses the 
key public and private actors to make sure it does. Because the human 
rights dimensions cannot be addressed in isolation, there is an urgent 
need to address the legal, political, ethical, and moral implications of 
the development of lethal robotic technologies.
C. Trends in the Development of Lethal Robotic Technology
While the use of lethal robots in the context of war is not unprec-
edented,19 their development and use has dramatically increased since 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, and 
the enormous growth in military research and development that the 
conflicts precipitated. Military experts have noted that the two con-
flicts are serving as real-time laboratories of “extraordinary develop-
ment” for “robotic warfare.”20
The primary user of this technology is the United States. Between 
2000 and 2008, the number of U.S. unmanned aircraft systems increased 
from less than fifty to over 6,000.21 Similarly, the number of unmanned 
ground vehicles deployed by the U.S. Department of Defense increased 
from less than 100 in 2001 to nearly 4,400 by 2007.22 Other states, includ-
ing Canada, Germany, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
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and South Korea, have also developed or are developing unmanned 
systems.23
Presently, the robotic weapons technologies most in use are systems 
that are remotely, but directly, operated by a human being. A well-
known example is the “BomBot,” a vehicle which can be driven by 
remote control to an improvised explosive device (IED), drop an explo-
sive charge on the IED, and then be driven away before the charge 
is detonated.24 Another example is the Special Weapons Observation 
Reconnaissance Detection System (SWORDS) and its successor, the 
Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS). SWORDS is a 
small robot that can be mounted with almost any weapon that weighs 
less than 300 pounds, including machine guns, rifles, grenade launch-
ers, and rocket launchers, and can travel in a variety of terrains.25 It 
can be operated by remote control and video cameras from up to two 
miles away, and be used for street patrols and checkpoint security as 
well as to guard posts. MAARS is similar, but can carry more powerful 
weapons and can also be mounted with less-than-lethal weapons such 
as tear gas.26
The level of automation that generally exists in currently deployed 
systems is limited to the ability of, for example, an unmanned combat 
aerial vehicle or a laser-guided bomb to be programmed to take-off 
and navigate or de-ice by itself, or with only human monitoring (as 
opposed to control). In June 2010, trials were held in which helicopters 
carried out fully autonomous flights.27 Sentry systems also exist, which 
can patrol automatically around a sensitive storage facility or a base. 
The Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS), for 
instance, is a small “robotic patrol force on wheels designed to relieve 
personnel of the repetitive and sometimes dangerous task of patrolling 
exterior areas” and can “autonomously [perform] random patrols.”28 
For currently existing systems that have lethal capability, the choice of 
target and the decision to fire the weapon is made by human beings, 
and it is a human being who actually fires the weapon, albeit by remote 
control. With such weapons systems, there is, in military terminology, a 
“man in the loop,” so that the determination to use lethal force, as with 
any other kind of weapon, lies with the operator and the chain of com-
mand. Examples of such semi-automated weapons systems currently 
in use include Predator and Reaper drones,29 deployed in the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States and the United Kingdom, 
and Israeli Harpy drones. Systems that would replace this generation 
of technology include the Sky Warrior, an unmanned aircraft system 
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capable of taking off and landing automatically, with the capacity to 
carry and fire four Hellfire missiles.30
“Swarm” technologies are also being developed to enable a small 
number of military personnel to control a large number of machines 
remotely. One system under development envisions that a single oper-
ator will monitor a group of semi-autonomous aerial robotic weapons 
systems through a wireless network that connects each robot to the 
others and to the operator. Each robot within a “swarm” would fly 
autonomously to a designated area, “and will ‘detect’ threats and tar-
gets through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), sensory information 
and image processing.”31 Robotic technology is also becoming faster 
and more capable of increasingly rapid response. Military strategic 
documents predict the development of technology that speeds up the 
time needed for machines to respond to a perceived threat with lethal 
force “to micro or nanoseconds…Increasingly humans will no longer 
be ‘in the loop’ but rather ‘on the loop’—monitoring the execution of 
certain decisions.”32 The speed of the envisioned technology would be 
enhanced by networking among unmanned machines which would be 
able to “perceive and act” faster than humans can.
To date, armed robotic systems operating on any more than a semi-
automated basis have not been used against targets. Some states’ 
military representatives indicate that humans will, for the foreseeable 
future, remain in the loop on any decisions to use lethal force.33 The 
U.S. Department of Defense, for example, has stated that: “For a sig-
nificant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch 
a missile from an unmanned system will not be fully automated,” but 
notes that “[m]any aspects of the firing sequence will,” even if the final 
“decision to fire will not likely be fully automated until legal, rules of 
engagement, and safety concerns have all been thoroughly examined 
and resolved.”34 However, some roboticists note that the “advent of 
autonomous lethal robotic systems is well underway and it is a simple 
matter of time before autonomous engagements of targets are pres-
ent on the battlefield.”35 A number of countries are already reportedly 
deploying or developing systems with the capacity to take humans out 
of the lethal decision-making loop. For example:
•  Since approximately 2007, Israel has deployed remote-controlled 
7.62 mm machine-guns mounted on watch-towers every few hun-
dred yards along its border with Gaza as part of its “Sentry Tech” 
weapons system, also known as “Spot and Shoot” or in Hebrew, 
“Roeh-Yoreh” (Sees-Fires).36 This “robotic sniper” system locates 
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potential targets through sensors and transmits information to an 
operations command center where a soldier can locate and track the 
target and shoot to kill.37 Dozens of alleged terrorists have been shot 
with the Sentry Tech system.38 The first reported killing of an indi-
vidual with Sentry Tech appears to have taken place during Oper-
ation Cast Lead in December 2008.39 Two alleged terrorists were 
killed using the system in December 2009,40 and another person was 
killed and four injured by Sentry Tech in March 2010; according 
to media accounts it is unclear whether the dead and injured were 
farmers or gunmen.41 Future plans envision a “closed loop” system, 
in which no human intervention would be required in the identifi-
cation, targeting, and kill process.42
•  South Korea has developed the SGR-1, an unmanned gun tower. 
Beginning in July 2010, it is performing sentry duty on an experi-
mental basis in the demilitarized zone between North and South 
Korea.43 The SGR-1 uses heat and motion detectors and pattern rec-
ognition algorithms to sense possible intruders; it can alert remotely-
located command center operators who can use the SGR-1’s audio 
and video communications system to assess the threat and make 
the decision to fire the robot’s 5.5 millimeter machine gun.44 Media 
accounts indicate that although the decision to use lethal force is 
made by human commanders now, the robot has been equipped 
with the capacity to fire on its own.45
Such automated technologies are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated, and artificial intelligence reasoning and decision-making abilities 
are actively being researched and receive significant funding. States’ 
militaries and defense industry developers are working to develop 
“fully autonomous capability” such that “technological advances in 
artificial intelligence will enable [unmanned aerial vehicles] to make 
and execute complex decisions,” including the identification of human 
targets and the ability to kill them.46 A 2003 U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand commissioned study reportedly predicted the development 
of “artificial intelligence and automatic target recognition [that] will 
give robots the ability to hunt down and kill the enemy with limited 
human supervision by 2015.”47 Among the envisioned uses for fully 
automated weapons systems are: “non-lethal through lethal crowd 
control, dismounted offensive operations, and armed reconnaissance 
and assault operations.”48 One already developed ground robot, the 
Guardium UGV, is a high-speed vehicle that can be weaponized and 
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used for combat support as well as border patrols and other security 
missions, such as perimeter security at airports and power plants.49
D. Concerns
Although robotic or unmanned weapons technology has developed at 
an astonishing rate, the public debate over the legal, ethical, and moral 
issues arising from its use is at a very early stage, and very little con-
sideration has been given to the international legal framework neces-
sary for dealing with the resulting issues.
There are many possible advantages flowing from the use of exist-
ing and developing technologies.50 They may be able to act as “force 
multipliers,” greatly expanding the capacity or reach of a military, and 
robots may be sacrificed or sent into hazardous situations too risky for 
human soldiers. They may be less economically costly than deploying 
humans. And indeed, their destruction does not result in the ending 
of irreplaceable human life. In the words of a U.S. government report, 
“[m]ore and more robots are being destroyed or damaged in combat 
instead of Servicemen and women being killed or wounded, and this is 
the preferred outcome.”51 Robots may be able to use lethal force more 
conservatively than humans (because they “do not need to have self-
preservation as a foremost drive”52), and their actions and responses 
may be faster, based on information processed from more sources, and 
more accurate, enabling them to reduce collateral damage and other 
errors made by humans. They may also be able to avoid mistakes or 
harms resulting from human emotions or states, such as fear, tired-
ness, and the desire for revenge. And to the extent that machines are 
equipped with the ability to record operations and monitor compli-
ance with legal requirements, they may increase military transparency 
and accountability.
These hypothetical advantages, however, may not necessarily be 
reflected in the design or programming of actual technologies. And the 
reality, to date, is that technological developments have far outpaced 
even discussions of the humanitarian and human rights implications 
of the deployment of lethal robotic technologies. The following con-
cerns are among those that require in-depth examination:53
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1. Definitions
The lack of a uniform set of definitions of key terms such as “autono-
mous,” “autonomy,” or “robots” constitutes a significant obstacle to 
addressing the legal and ethical ramifications of these technologies. 
Uses of these terms vary significantly among the militaries of different 
nation-states, as well as among defense industry personnel, academ-
ics, and civilians.54 Confusion can result, for example, from differences 
over whether “autonomous” describes the ability of a machine to act 
in accordance with moral and ethical reasoning ability, or whether it 
might simply refer to the ability to take action independent of human 
control (e.g., a programmed drone that can take off and land without 
human direction, or a thermometer that registers temperatures).55 As 
the international community begins to debate robotic technologies, it 
will need to at least seek a shared understanding of the systems and 
their characteristics.
2. International and Criminal Responsibility
One of the most important issues flowing from increased automation 
is the question of responsibility for civilian casualties or other harms 
or violations of the laws of war. As I have analyzed at length else-
where,56 international human rights and humanitarian law, as applied 
in the context of armed conflict or law enforcement, set standards 
that are designed to protect or minimize harm to civilians, and set 
limits on the use of force by states’ militaries, police, or other armed 
forces. When these limits are violated, states may be internationally 
responsible for the wrongs committed, and officials or others may bear 
individual criminal responsibility. Both the international human rights 
and humanitarian law frameworks are predicated on the fundamental 
premise that they bind states and individuals, and seek to hold them 
to account. When robots are operated by remote control and the ulti-
mate decision to use lethal force is made by humans, individual and 
command responsibility for any resulting harms is generally readily 
determinable.
However, as automation increases, the frameworks of state and 
individual responsibility become increasingly difficult to apply. Who 
is responsible if a robot kills civilians in violation of applicable inter-
national law—the programmer who designed the program governing 
the robot’s actions, any military officials who may have approved the 
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programming, a human commander assigned responsibility for that 
robot, a soldier who might have exercised oversight but opted not to 
do so? What if the killing is attributed to a malfunction of some sort? 
Is the government that deployed the robot responsible, or the principal 
engineer or manufacturer, or the individual who bore ultimate respon-
sibility for programing, or someone else? What level of supervision 
does a human need to exercise over a robot in order to be responsible 
for its actions? Are circumstances conceivable in which robots could 
legitimately be programmed to act in violation of the relevant interna-
tional law, or conversely, could they be programmed to automatically 
override instructions that they consider, under the circumstances, to 
be a violation of that law? Are there situations in which it would be 
appropriate to conclude that no individual should be held accountable 
despite the clear fact that unlawful actions have led to civilian or other 
deaths?
Some argue that robots should never be fully autonomous, that it 
would be unethical to permit robots to autonomously kill, because 
no human would clearly be responsible and the entire framework of 
accountability would break down. Others, such as Ronald Arkin, argue 
that it will be possible to design ethical systems of responsibility.57 In 
his view, robots could be better ethical decision-makers than humans 
because they lack emotion and fear. In addition, they could be pro-
grammed to ensure compliance with humanitarian law standards and 
applicable rules of engagement. Still others respond that such think-
ing is predicated on unproven assumptions about the nature of rules 
and how robots may be programmed to understand them, and that it 
underestimates the extent to which value systems and ethics inform 
the application of the rules in ways that robots cannot replicate.58 In 
order to understand how to apportion responsibility for violations of 
the law, say some ethicists, more research needs to be done both to 
understand how and why humans themselves decide to follow the law 
and ethical rules, as well as the extent to which robotic programming 
mimics or differs from human decision-making.
To the extent that unmanned systems are not being designed to 
support investigation, they raise additional transparency and account-
ability concerns. Perhaps most troublingly from an international law 
perspective, some have indicated that, “unmanned systems are not 
designed to support investigation. They do not archive information.” 
They leave open the possibility of “soldiers pointing to the machine, 
declaring, ‘I’m not responsible—the machine is.’ ”59 In order to comport 
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with the international law obligation of a state to provide accountabil-
ity for the use of lethal force, any unmanned weapons system, regard-
less of the degree of automation, must not hinder—and indeed should 
facilitate—the state’s ability to investigate wrongful conduct.
3. Safeguards and Standards for Deployment
Another significant problem concerns the ability of robots to comply 
with human rights and humanitarian law, and the standards relevant 
to programming and the development of technology for deployment. 
What standards or testing must be conducted before armed machines 
are able to conduct crowd control, patrol in civilian populated areas, or 
be enabled to decide to target an alleged combatant? While any kind of 
technology has the potential to malfunction and result in lethal error, 
the particular concern with the rapid development of robotic weapons 
is whether (and the extent to which) technical safeguards are built 
into the systems to prevent the inadvertent or otherwise wrongful or 
mistaken use of lethal force. What programming or other technical 
safeguards have been and should be put in place to ensure that the 
precautions required by international humanitarian law are taken? 
What programming safeguards would international humanitarian law 
require?
Troublingly, military and civilian experts acknowledge that robotic 
development in general is being driven by the defense industry, and 
“[f]ew systems in the field have been subjected to rigorous or stan-
dardized testing or experimentation.”60 The U.S. military, for instance, 
admits that in the interests of saving military lives in the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, robotic systems may be deployed without the 
requisite testing for whether those systems are in fact reliable.61
In the context of armed conflict generally, and especially in urban 
areas, military personnel often have difficulty discriminating between 
those who may be lawfully targeted (combatants or those directly par-
ticipating in hostilities) and civilians, who may not. Such decision-mak-
ing requires the exercise of judgment, sometimes in rapidly changing 
circumstances and in a context that is not readily amenable to categori-
zation as to whether the applicable legal requirements of necessity and 
proportionality are met and whether all appropriate precautions have 
been taken. It is not clear what criteria would be used to determine if a 
robot is ever capable of making such decisions in the manner required, 
or how to evaluate the programs that might purport to have inte-
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grated all such considerations into a given set of instructions to guide 
a robotic technology.
In addition, there is the concern that the development of lethal 
capacity has outpaced the development of safeguards against techni-
cal or communications error. For example, military strategic planning 
documents caution that it “may be technically feasible” for unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS) to have nuclear strike capability before safe-
guards are developed for the systems, and that “[e]thical discussions 
and policy decisions must take place in the near term in order to guide 
the development of future UAS capabilities, rather than allowing the 
development to take its own path.”62
There are also questions about how and when the benefits of 
speedy processing of intelligence and other data is outweighed by the 
risks posed by hasty decision-making. Man-on-the-loop systems, for 
instance, raise the concern that technology is being developed that is 
beyond the human capacity to supervise effectively and in accordance 
with applicable law. With respect to swarm technologies, some research 
has found that human operators’ performance levels are reduced by an 
average of 50 percent when they control even two unmanned aircraft 
systems at a time.63 The research suggests that the possibility of lethal 
error rises as humans play a “supervisory” role over a larger number 
of machines. Unless adequate precautions are taken and built into sys-
tems, the likelihood increases that mistakes will be made which will 
amount to clear violations of the applicable laws.
A related concern is what safeguards should or must be put in place 
to prevent ultimate human control of robots from being circumvented, 
and what safeguards can be implemented to prevent lethal robots from 
being hacked or used by, for example, insurgent or terrorist groups.
4. Civilian Support
An important political consideration is whether the widespread use of 
robots in civilian settings, such as for law enforcement in cities or in 
counter-insurgency operations, would alienate the very populations 
they were meant to assist. Over-reliance on technology increases the 
risk that policymakers and commanders will focus on the relatively 
easy use of armed or lethal tactics to the detriment of all the other 
elements necessary to end a conflict—including winning hearts and 
minds—and that policymakers will overestimate the ability of new 
technologies to achieve sustainable peace. In addition, while robots 
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may have the benefit of not acting based on emotion, they also do 
not have the kind of sympathy, remorse, or empathy that often appro-
priately tempers and informs the conduct of fighters and their com-
manders.
5. Use of Force Threshold and Jus ad Bellum Considerations
To the extent that decisions about whether to go to war are limited by 
the prospect of loss of life of military personnel and the high economic 
cost of warfare, robotic armies may make it easier for policymakers 
to choose to enter into an armed conflict, increasing the potential for 
violating jus ad bellum requirements. This may be particularly the case 
when the other side lacks the same level of technology. Similarly, within 
the context of armed conflict, insofar as robots are remotely controlled 
by humans who are themselves in no physical danger, there is the 
concern that an operator’s location far from the battlefield will encour-
age a “Playstation” mentality to fighting and killing. The threshold 
at which, for example, drone operators would be willing to use force 
could potentially decrease. Thus, the international community should 
consider whether and when reduced risk to a state’s armed forces 
resulting from the extensive use of robotic technologies might unac-
ceptably increase the risk to civilian populations on the opposing side.
To summarize, in relation to the development and use of robotic tech-
nologies, especially those with the potential to be used in warfare, 
there is a pressing need to give more sustained consideration to the 
legal, ethical, and moral challenges that are likely to emerge. Particular 
attention should be given to identify ways in which proactive steps 
can be taken to ensure that such technologies are optimized in terms of 
their capacity to promote more effective compliance with international 
human rights and humanitarian law.
One way forward would be for the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral to convene a group consisting of military and civilian representa-
tives from states, leading authorities in human rights and humanitarian 
law, applied philosophers and ethicists, scientists, and weapons devel-
opers to advise on measures and guidelines designed to promote that 
goal. In that context, consideration could be given to requiring that 
any unmanned or robotic weapons system have the same—or better—
safety standards as comparable manned systems. Guidelines should 
be considered in terms of requiring tests to ensure minimum stan-
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dards of reliability and performance before new lethal technologies 
are deployed. In the design of new technologies, efforts should also be 
made to promote the inclusion of recording systems and other ways 
to facilitate effective investigation of instances in which it is alleged 
that the weapon has been used in violation of the applicable law. In 
addition, such a group could address the need for greater definitional 
uniformity in relation to the types of technology being developed, the 
need for empirical studies to better understand the human rights impli-
cations of the technologies, and the fundamental question of whether 
lethal force should ever be permitted to be fully automated.
IV. Conclusion
While the differences between the two case studies of extrajudicial exe-
cutions considered in this article—the killing of witches and targeted 
killings by robotic technologies—are certainly significant, the key point 
for present purposes concerns the similarity between the two when 
viewed from the perspective of the international human rights regime. 
The norms reflected therein clearly aim to protect the right to life of all 
individuals in times of peace, and to protect the lives of civilians and 
non-combatants in times of armed conflict. Although those goals have 
been accepted in one form or another by all governments in the world, 
this does not mean that the move from broad normative acceptance to 
compliance in practice is easy or straightforward. Indeed, the paired 
example of witches and robots illustrates very clearly the principal 
challenges that consistently arise in response to endeavors to promote 
respect for these abstract norms in concrete situations.
Governments and their supporters, whether in response to allega-
tions of using new technologies to carry out targeted killings or of not 
taking adequate action in response to the killing of witches, are likely 
to resort to defensive strategies that are remarkably similar. Often, 
the first step will be to assert that the issue in question is a matter 
exclusively for the sovereign decision-making authority of the state 
and thus not a legitimate matter for international concern. Despite its 
regular and predictable invocation by governments that are subject to 
criticism, this argument is rarely taken seriously, even by other govern-
ments. Human rights are now widely accepted as matters of legitimate 
concern for all governments and the international community as a 
whole.
This argument thus gives way to a second step, which is to argue 
that while the basic norm (in this case the right not to be arbitrarily 
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deprived of one’s life) is entirely accepted, its agreed upon interpreta-
tion does not extend so far as to clearly and unequivocally cover the 
particular practices being challenged. At the same time, a claim to the 
moral high ground will be asserted by calling for new norms to govern 
the relevant problem.64
The third response will be that national law and institutions are 
adequate to deal with the matter. Thus, for example, the government 
of the Central African Republic might point to the fact that, under its 
criminal code, a person convicted of witchcraft can face capital punish-
ment, a prison sentence, or a fine. And the government of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo might draw attention to the constitutional 
prohibition of parental abandonment of children for alleged sorcery, 
as well as to the 2009 Child Protection Law, which provides for a 
prison sentence for any adult, including parents, who accuse children 
of witchcraft. Similarly, the United States government will draw atten-
tion to its detailed standards governing the conduct of the military and 
combine this with a commitment to ensure that everything possible is 
done to ensure compliance with relevant international standards. The 
problem, of course, will often be in the implementation of such stan-
dards in practice, rather than with the law on the books.
The fourth standard response by governments is to contest the 
facts and claim that the allegations cannot be proved. While this latter 
approach raises empirical rather than normative issues, it highlights 
one of the most difficult challenges for the international human rights 
regime, which is to meet even a fairly basic burden of proof in relation 
to complex allegations.
This array of responses to alleged unlawful killings also brings into 
clear relief the main challenges that the regime faces. In essence, they 
are threefold. The first is the creation of public awareness of the issues, 
followed by more sustained reflection both by civil society and govern-
ments on the best approaches to be adopted in order to give effect to 
the human rights commitment. The second is to ensure the constant 
normative development of the basic standards so that their significance 
and implications in specific contexts are better understood and their 
content is elaborated and expanded upon to enable them to deal with 
new issues and problems. Third, and in some ways the most important 
because of its role in relation to the first two, is to develop institutional 
arrangements at the international level to both facilitate the normative 
evolution of the standards and to promote compliance by states and 
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